In this paper, we outline a brief history of technologies against Internet-wide threats, especially DDoS attacks, and enumerate the requirements of wide area and cross-organization collaboration mechanism. Subsequently we introduce IODEF, which is under discussion at INCH WG of IETF for the purpose of incident information exchange, and show the potential and effectiveness of wide-area collaboration by developing a prototype of wide area traceback application with IODEF.
Introduction
The recent security threats are getting to be better organized and covering wider areas. Attackers are using more sophisticated and integrated techniques to make their attack effective. However, networks, which are potential victims, are likely to be independent and relatively isolated. It means each network has to defend its network with only its own resources. To operate a network properly, there are lot of things to be done continuously, like collecting recent vulnerability information, evaluating the organisation's own information asset and the risk, and applying appropriate patches/policy/education.
Internet is a fully distributed and collaboratively operated network. So, cooperation and collaboration has been done by network operators through human communication. But, recent diversification of security risk requires more sophisticated and automated cross-organization and wide-area information exchange.
One of most serious threats requiring wide area collaboration is DDoS (Denial of Service) attack. The typical DDoS attack is carried out by well organized large number of compromised hosts. The information about such available compromised hosts is likely to be shared in underground black hat networks. Furthermore, they also exchange actual exploit code and techniques. As a result, network security has always lagged behind the actual threat.
To win this losing competition against black hat community, well-organized and coordinated approach is strongly required. In this paper, we focus on such wide-area collaboration mechanism through a counter measure of DDoS attack. First, we briefly survey the history of this research area and outline our own approach. Next, we introduce standardization activities at IETF to realize wide area traceback. Finally, we show the potential and effectiveness of wide area collaboration through our development of prototype wide-area traceback system.
Traceback
In this section, we mention the requirements of wide-area cooperation, both through our activities and others, to realize traceback.
The heart of the problem against DDoS attack is address spoofing. In current Internet architecture, attacker can spoof source address of attack packet easily. So, the address in packet is no longer reliable. As a result, packet filtering and firewall like approach do not work. The attacker can control the source address, and often change them randomly. And even if the attack packet can be filtered by methods like approximation or maximum bandwidth limitation technique, attack packets are still on the network, and consume the network resource illegally. Traceback is considered as effective counter measure against the spoofed attack, as it is not only defense, but also introduces the possibility of clean up of the attacks. Once real attacker is identified, it can be disconnected from the Internet, and there is a possibility to treat it like any other general crime, and punish it.
There have been some traceback technologies proposed and developed. [1] surveyed and summarized the variety of existing proposals well. According to the survey, those can be categorized into two major types of concepts; one is designed as part of network infrastructure, the other is designed as an add-on/independent application. [2] and [3] are approaches as infrastructure, which facilitate the traceback function to network side. Routers on the attack path monitor the transit packets and generate or add some evidence information from monitored packets. By collecting and analyzing that evidence information, victim can know the attack path. So, once it is deployed widely, everyone can realize the traceback. But this approach necessarily needs standardization and wide deployment of the function on routers in the Internet, it is hard for network operators who need traceback to control, and may take long time. The approach [4] collects evidence by sensors deployed by traceback system owner. This approach can construct and deploy all elements for traceback by the system administrator; however the scope is limited in the administrative network.
Pattern-based traceback
We proposed a traffic pattern-based attacker tracking mechanism [5, 6] , and these are one of first proposals of traceback against the (D)DoS attack. Using the traffic pattern as the footprint/evidence of the attacker, the correlation coefficient is used to correlate and track the footprint.
Traffic pattern is defined by the sequence of number of packets at time slots at each monitoring point, which is modeled by size of time slot d, size of window D and metric of each slot (Fig. 1 ).
All incoming and outgoing traffic patterns are modeled as following vector data.
Traffic pattern correlation is based on correlation coefficient, calculated as follows. Here, A is incoming pattern, then B is outgoing.
In case that rðA; BÞ is close to 1, the traffic from A went through B. One of the advantages of correlation coefficient is that absolute value of the metric can be neglected. This method does not require payload information of packet, and uses only simple statistical information to compare the events observed at different points, therefore it can be applied for DoS attacks with spoofed address, and handle huge number of packets. Furthermore, it does not violate the user's privacy. This is essentially an approximation approach and accuracy is one of the points of evaluation. However, the target is only DoS traffic, which has extreme characteristics, so it works with enough accuracy as an in-house/local traceback system.
Packet Chaser
To overcome the accuracy issue and improve the applicability to backbone network, we developed another original traceback technology. This is a member of hash-based traceback family. The proposed method translate observed packet into hash value with one way hash function, and stores it in a cyclic buffer. When any suspicious packet observed, the packet (hash value) is translated into a hash value, and a search is done to see whether the same packet is in the cyclic buffer or not. It has clear advantages against the known hash-based traceback system proposed in [4] . Figure 2 shows the basic concept of Packet Chaser. Essentially, it uses packet information as evidence instead of pattern information described in previous section. And the point of this idea is producing 'packet print' from raw input packet with one way hash function. The core requirement to correlate observations at different monitoring points is only uniqueness of packet, not the payload information. The important difference between [4] and the families is that all observed packets translated into its hash value immediately and there is no any raw payload information stored. It requires no raw/payload information even for the query. Only hashed and never reverse translatable information is in the system. Figure 3 shows the architecture from the perspective of implementation. At agent side, printing engine invokes hash function like MD5 and/or SHA1, and produces the unique packet print. The agent stores it into cyclic buffer to maintain the hash values within certain period. To search a particular packet print, we used SNMP (Simple Network Management protocol), and all packet print in cyclic buffer is indexed by its hash-value in the MIB, which is the design for an effective search. As SNMP is well standardized and deployed widely, it is easily integrated into existing network management framework.
By using hash value for both store and search, the original packet is never seen anywhere on the system, so it can protect privacy. Furthermore, this can achieve per packet traceback accuracy.
Issues of current traceback technology
Some of proposals and technologies introduced in this section, including our own technologies, confirmed to work well within a single administrative network. But, practical traceback across multiple administrative network, ISPs, and/ or ASes have not been realized yet. To realize it, some information exchange techniques are required to be deployed among every related network to collect evidence of attack packet beyond the limitation of management scope.
The heart of current traceback problem is how to exchange evidence information and share the common target information of traceback. In other words, how to collect 'evidence' of whether the attack packets actually went through the network or not.
General Requirements for Information Exchange
Other than traceback, information sharing/exchange is required. For example, CERT(s) and similar organization in the world have been publishing various advisory on newly discovered vulnerabilities or on security enlightenment document. Timely advisory can contribute to decrease in the risk of outbreak of attacks. However, now the threat and vulnerabilities of Internet are getting diversified, it is getting more and more difficult to respond to any incident quickly. So, to make their activity more effective, CERT(s) in the world began to collaborate to collect, analyze, and publish security information. In that process, common infrastructure is required.
To know the actual internet situation, to make information collection more effective, and to make taking actual action possible for the observed incident, INCH (Incident Handling) WG at IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) is trying to define common format of message and the transportation, which will be standardized. [7] mentions and calls for discussion on the fundamental requirements of such message and protocols.
IODEF (Incident Object Description and Exchange Format) [8] is one of the candidates to realize such information exchange. It is trying to define standard data model and XML implementation for describing general incident information.
RID (Real-time Internet Defense) [9] is an application of IODEF message, which is trying to use IODEF message for a particular purpose, that is traceback. So, RID includes query and response mechanism to exchange IODEF message for wide area traceback.
On the other hand, there are some Internet sensor networks [10] [11] [12] , which are approaches to know actual wide-area activity of Internet, and there are similar approaches in Japan also.
[13] is operated by police department in Japan. JPCERT operates [14] also. IPA (Information technology Promotion Agency) is operating TALOT (Trend, Access, Logging, Observation, Tool) [15] for early warning of Internet threat. IODEF is expected to help in exchanging incident information observed at these sensor networks.
Prototype Development
We developed wide-area traceback system with IODEF scheme. For traceback system, IODEF-RID scheme to implement query-response communication between multiple traceback systems is deployed in different networks. Using this common communication protocol, each network can use its own favorite traceback system to manage their network. Figure 4 shows the scheme of IODEF-RID to realize wide-area traceback. The system consists of three components. Those are manager, RID server, and the local traceback system. In this paper, we used hash-based traceback system mentioned in Section 2.2 as local traceback system. We added IODEF-RID interface on top of the system.
The Manager is illustrated as a Wide area tracker in the figure above, which receives SNORT [16] alert including packet print for traceback, and composes query with reported packet print in IODEF-RID. The transport of query and response is HTTP or SMTP for practical communication across public Internet. RID server receives queries from manager, invokes the local traceback system, and sends back the result to manager as IODEF-RID response. Local traceback system is anything traceback which can operate traceback inside its own administrative domain. In this paper, we use our Packet Chaser as local traceback. Figure 5 shows the sample messages of IODEF-RID, which is query-response message. Upper part of the window is query XML message, where message type is ''TraceRequest'', lower part is the sample of positive response, ''SourceFound'' element is ''true''.
By using existing standards, like HTTP/SMTP as transport, and XML as message description, different local traceback system can communicate each other. And using standardizing IODEF-RID message as communication payload will help realize actual collaboration for wide-area traceback. Figure 6 shows the sample result of traceback. To extract IODEF-RID response message, the source network can be highlighted on visualized network map. Figure 7 shows the case of a wider area. Each circle indicates an AS (Autonomous System). Furthermore, visualized traceback result may be conveyed to another administrator, system, and/or network. By using the optional (AdditionalData) element of IODEF message, we can display such information also. 
Conclusion
Attackers are getting more organized and are collaborating in a sophisticated manner. However, network operations are likely to be left alone because of lack of appropriate collaboration mechanism, which has to be established to strike a balance between network independence and proper information sharing. In this paper, we have made a strong case for requirement of collaboration through the study on counter measures for wide-area Internet threats. As a concrete application requiring such collaboration mechanism, we developed wide-area traceback system. To realize it, we adopted IODEF and RID, which are under standardizing process, and showed their basic effectiveness. Furthermore, we have shown that these schemes and architecture have potential applications to general network management, which require reporting and information sharing system on events occurring in the network. 
